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  background?	  	  
A	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  of	  Wollheim	  and	  Greenberg	  
on	  the	  representational	  character	  of	  abstract	  pictures	  
Elisa	  Caldarola	  
1.	  The	  framework	  
What	  do	  we	  mean	  when	  we	  say	  that	  a	  picture	  is	  abstract?	  Is	  there	  any	  relevant	  aspect	  
that	   abstract	   and	   figurative	   pictures	   share?	   In	   particular,	   is	   there	   any	   similarity	   in	   the	  
way	  abstract	  and	  figurative	  pictures	  represent?	  These	  are	  the	  key	  questions	  that	  outline	  
the	  framework	  of	  this	  article.	  Focussing	  on	  some	  claims	  addressed	  by	  Richard	  Wollheim	  
and	  Clement	  Greenberg	   I	   investigate	  how	  the	  concepts	  of	  depicted	  figure,	  background	  
of	  a	  pictorial	  scene	  and	  ground	  of	  a	  picture	  are	  relevant	  for	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  re-­‐
lation	   between	   figurative	   and	   abstract	   pictures,	   especially	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   consider	  
whether	  abstract	  pictures	  can	  be	  said	  to	  represent	  pictorially.	  
2.	  “Abstract”	  pictures	  and	  figurative	  pictures	  
There	  are	  various	  uses	  of	   the	  adjective	   “abstract”	   in	   relation	   to	  pictures.	   (1)	  A	  picture	  
can	  have	  an	  abstract	  subject	  if,	  for	  instance,	  it	  is	  said	  to	  represent	  an	  immaterial	  object.	  
In	  the	  Christian	  tradition,	  the	  Holy	  Spirit	   is	  often	  represented	  by	  depictions	  of	  doves.	  It	  
must	  be	  noted	  that	  a	  picture’s	  abstract	  subject	  is	  not	  the	  content	  that	  is	  depicted	  by	  the	  
picture,	  because	  it	  does	  not	  have	  visual	  features:	  when	  the	  Holy	  Spirit	  is	  represented	  by	  
the	  picture	  of	  a	  dove	  it	   is	  symbolically	  represented.	  The	  object	  that	   is	  pictorially	  repre-­‐
sented	  is	  the	  dove.	  (2)	  Figurative	  pictures	  in	  general	  can	  be	  said	  to	  have	  abstract	  charac-­‐
ter	   since,	   in	  order	   to	  depict,	   the	  painter	  needs	   to	  abstract	   from	  a	   variety	  of	   elements	  
that	  characterize	  the	  realm	  of	  our	  experience,	  such	  as	  the	  third	  dimension,	  movement	  
and	  the	  succession	  of	  events	  in	  time.	  (3)	  There	  is	  a	  use	  of	  the	  expression	  “abstract	  pic-­‐
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ture”,	  however,	  that	  is	  much	  more	  widespread	  than	  the	  others:	  “abstract	  picture”	  is	  in-­‐
tended	  as	  synonymous	  with	  “non-­‐figurative	  picture”	  and	  is	  applied	  to	  pictures	  that	  have	  
been	  produced,	  largely,	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  Western	  visual	  art	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  XX	  
century.	  This	   is	  the	  meaning	  of	  “abstract	  picture”	   I	  shall	  concern	  myself	  with.	   If	  a	  non-­‐
figurative	  picture	  is	  an	  abstract	  picture,	  then	  one	  could	  think	  that	  figuration	  is	  what	  ab-­‐
stract	  pictures	  abstract	  from.	  Sometimes	  this	   is	  true:	  abstract	  pictures	  are	  abstractions	  
from	  subjects	  that	  could	  be	  rendered	  figuratively.	  This,	   for	   instance,	   is	  true	  of	  many	  of	  
Wassily	  Kandinsky’s	  earlier	  abstract	  landscapes,	  where	  we	  can	  observe	  that	  the	  painter	  
progressively	   explored	   new	  ways	   to	  make	   his	   landscapes	   less	   and	   less	   evident	   to	   the	  
viewer	   (to	   the	   point	   that	   no	   landscape	   could	   be	   recognized	   while	   looking	   at	   the	   pic-­‐
tures),	   in	  order	  to	  maximize	  the	  viewer’s	  attention	  to	  the	  disposition	  of	  marks	  and	  col-­‐
ours	   on	   the	   pictorial	   surface.	   The	   same	   is	   true	   of	   Piet	  Mondrian’s	   Tree	   Series	   (1908-­‐
1913),	  where	  the	  painter	  has	  proceeded	  through	  progressive	  abstractions	  from	  the	  figu-­‐
rative	  representation	  of	  trees.	  However,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  there	  are	  many	  cases	  of	  abstract	  
painting	  where	  it	  does	  not	  make	  sense	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  painter	  has	  abstracted	  from	  any	  
visual	  object	  or	  scene:	  think	  of	  Mark	  Rothko’s	  late	  period	  abstracts,	  for	  instance.	  There-­‐
fore,	   it	  would	  not	  be	   correct	   to	   claim	   that	   all	   abstract	  paintings	   are	   abstractions	   from	  
subjects	  that	  could,	  in	  principle,	  be	  figuratively	  represented.	  
What	  is	  certain	  is	  that	  the	  label	  “abstract	  picture”	  originated	  in	  the	  context	  of	  avant-­‐
garde	  visual	  art	  in	  the	  early	  XX	  century.	  It	  can	  be	  said	  that	  a	  strategy	  of	  displacement	  of	  
the	   horizons	   of	   art,	   favoured	   by	   avant-­‐garde	   visual	   art,	   consisted	   in	   creating	   objects	  
which	  made	  it	  difficult,	  or	  impossible,	  or	  meaningless,	  to	  easily	  trace	  the	  story	  that	  went	  
from	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  certain	  (real	  or	  fictional)	  visual	  object	  (or	  object	  of	  a	  certain	  kind)	  
and	  its	  representation	  through	  a	  visual	  art	  medium.	  I	  think	  that	  the	  best	  way	  intuitively	  
to	   express	   the	   difference	   between	   a	   figurative	   and	   an	   abstract	   picture	   is	   to	   say	   that	  
while,	  when	  we	  look	  at	  a	  figurative	  picture,	  we	  find	  it	  natural	  to	  describe	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  
the	  objects	  it	  depicts,	  when	  we	  look	  at	  an	  abstract	  picture	  we	  are	  prompted	  to	  describe	  
what	  we	  see	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  aspect	  of	  the	  marks	  and	  colours	  we	  see	  on	  the	  pictorial	  
surface.	  	  
Is	  there	  any	  relevant	  aspect	  that	  abstract	  and	  figurative	  pictures	  share,	  then?	  In	  par-­‐
ticular,	   is	   there	   any	   similarity	   in	   the	   way	   abstract	   and	   figurative	   pictures	   represent?	  
These	  are	  the	  key	  questions	  that	  outline	  the	  framework	  of	  this	  article.	  
In	  what	  follows	  I	  shall	  assume	  that	  pictorial	  representation	  is	  a	  distinctive	  feature	  of	  
(at	  least)	  all	  figurative	  pictures.	  With	  «pictorial	  representation»	  I	  intend	  the	  representa-­‐
tion	   of	   visual	   objects	   (or	   aspects	   of	   them)	   by	  means	   of	   the	   pictorial	   content	   of	   two-­‐
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dimensional	   pictorial	   surfaces	   (the	   content	   determined	   by	   the	   arrangement	   of	   marks	  
and	   colours	   on	   pictorial	   surfaces).	   This	   is	   a	   basic	   definition	   that	   does	   not	   require	   any	  
commitment	  to	  a	  specific	  view	  on	  the	  understanding	  of	  pictorial	  representation.	  The	  hy-­‐
pothesis	  from	  which	  I	  shall	  depart	  here	  is	  the	  following:	  if	  we	  agree	  that	  pictorial	  repre-­‐
sentation	  is	  a	  distinctive	  feature	  of	  figurative	  pictures,	  then	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  
relation	   between	   abstract	   and	   figurative	   pictures	   it	   makes	   sense	   to	   ask	   whether	   ab-­‐
stracts	   can	   be	   pictorial	   representations.	   I	   shall	   first	   examine	   Richard	  Wollheim’s	   claim	  
that	   certain	  abstract	  pictures	  pictorially	   represent	   in	   the	   same	  way	   that	   figurative	  pic-­‐
tures	  do,	  focussing	  especially	  on	  his	  understanding	  of	  pictorial	  elements	  emerging	  from	  
or	  receding	  out	  of	  the	  background	  of	  pictorial	  scenes.	  Then,	   I	  shall	  criticize	  Wollheim’s	  
proposal	  and	  show	  how	  alternative	  conceptual	  tools	  for	  understanding	  the	  representa-­‐
tional	  character	  of	  abstract	  pictures	  may	  be	  offered	  by	  Clement	  Greenberg.	  In	  particular,	  
I	  shall	  insist	  on	  the	  distinction	  between	  background	  (of	  a	  depicted	  scene)	  and	  ground	  (of	  
a	  picture	  qua	  material	  object).	  
3.	  Richard	  Wollheim	  and	  the	  emergence/recession	  criterion	  for	  pictorial	  representation	  
In	  Painting	  as	  an	  Art	  (1987)	  Wollheim	  argues	  that	  pictorial	  representation	  is	  always	  con-­‐
nected	  to	  a	  visual	  phenomenon,	  seeing-­‐in,	  that	  happens	  in	  presence	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  ob-­‐
jects,	   such	   as	   clouds,	   paintings,	  walls.	   Seeing-­‐in	   has	   a	   special	   phenomenology:	   «When	  
seeing-­‐in	  occurs,	   two	  things	  happen:	   I	  am	  visually	  aware	  of	   the	  surface	   I	   look	  at,	  and	   I	  
discern	  something	  standing	  out	   in	  front	  of,	  or	  (in	  certain	  cases)	  receding	  behind	  some-­‐
thing	  else»	  (Wollheim	  [1987]:	  48).	  The	  «something»,	  which	  is	  discerned,	  is	  the	  represen-­‐
tational	  object	  of	  the	  pictorial	  representation:	  for	  there	  to	  be	  pictorial	  experience	  such	  
an	   object	   (i)	  must	   be	   perceived	  while	   simultaneously	   paying	   attention	   to	   the	   pictorial	  
surface	  and	  (ii)	  it	  must	  be	  collocated	  in	  a	  spatial	  dimension	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  ex-­‐
perience	   of	   discerning	   «something	   standing	   out	   in	   front	   of,	   or	   […]	   receding	   behind	  
something	  else».	   This	  definition	  has	   interesting	   consequences	   for	   abstract	  pictures,	   as	  
the	  following	  passage	  shows:	  
Abstract	  art,	  as	  we	  have	  it,	  tends	  to	  be	  an	  art	  that	  is	  at	  once	  representational	  and	  abstract.	  
Most	  abstract	  paintings	  display	  images:	  or,	  to	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  the	  experience	  that	  we	  are	  
required	  to	  have	  in	  front	  of	  them	  is	  certainly	  one	  that	  involves	  attention	  to	  the	  marked	  sur-­‐
face	  but	  it	  is	  also	  one	  that	  involves	  an	  awareness	  of	  depth.	  In	  imposing	  the	  second	  demand	  
as	  well	  as	  the	  first,	  abstract	  paintings	  reveal	  themselves	  to	  be	  representational,	  and	  it	   is	  at	  
this	  point	  irrelevant	  that	  we	  can	  seldom	  put	  into	  adequate	  words	  just	  what	  they	  represent.	  
(Wollheim	  [1987]:	  62)	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Wollheim’s	  argument	  can	  be	  summed	  up	  as	  follows:	  
(P1):	  for	  a	  picture	  to	  be	  a	  pictorial	  representation,	  the	  experience	  it	  elicits	  in	  a	  standard	  
observer	  must	  include	  a	  sense	  of	  depth,	  which	  has	  to	  occur	  while	  the	  observer	  is	  looking	  
at	  the	  marked	  surface	  of	  the	  picture;	  	  
(P2)	  when	  we	  experience	  depth	  in	  a	  picture	  we	  see	  something	  standing	  out	   in	  front	  of	  
something	  else	  or	  receding	  behind	  something	  else;	  
(P3):	  several	  abstract	  pictures	  elicit	  such	  an	  experience	  of	  depth	  in	  the	  viewers	  who	  fo-­‐
cus	  their	  attention	  on	  the	  pictorial	  surface;	  	  
(C):	  it	  follows	  that	  those	  abstract	  pictures	  meet	  the	  requirements	  for	  pictorial	  represen-­‐
tation.	  
(P1)	  expresses	  Wollheim’s	  claim	  that	   representational	  character	   is	  an	  aspect	  of	  pic-­‐
tures	  we	  discover	  by	  means	  of	  «thematization»	  of	   them	  (Wollheim	  [1987]:	  20-­‐25).	  Ac-­‐
cording	   to	   Wollheim,	   thematizing	   pictures	   consists	   in	   attending	   to	   them	   while	   being	  
guided	  by	  the	  goal	  of	  acquiring	  content	  or	  meaning.	  This	  way	  we	  establish	  a	  form	  of	  con-­‐
tact	  with	  their	  makers,	  because	  we,	  so	  to	  speak,	  set	  ourselves	  on	  the	  trace	  of	  their	   in-­‐
tention	  to	  communicate	  a	  given	  content	  through	   the	  pictures.	  Recognition	  of	  figures	   is	  
just	  one	  of	  the	  possible	  outcomes	  of	  the	  thematization	  of	  pictures:	  by	  means	  of	  thema-­‐
tizing	  the	  pictorial	  content	  of	  an	  abstract	  picture,	  for	  example,	  we	  could	  grasp	  an	  artist’s	  
intention	   to	   represent	   some	   concept	   or	   emotional	   state.	   What	   is	   relevant	   for	   the	  
present	  discussion,	  however,	   is	   that	  according	   to	  Wollheim,	  whenever	  we	   thematize	  a	  
picture	   it	   is	  essential	   (i)	   that	  we	  have	  a	  specific	  experience	  of	  depth	  while	   looking	  at	   it	  
(i.e.	  the	  experience	  of	  seeing	  an	  element	  of	  the	  picture	  emerging	  from	  something	  else	  or	  
receding	  behind	  something	  else)	  and	   (ii)	   that	   this	  experience	  occurs	   simultaneously	   to	  
our	  focussing	  our	  visual	  attention	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  picture.	  For	  a	  better	  understand-­‐
ing	  of	  Wollheim’s	  argument,	  we	  can	  split	  (P1)	  into	  two	  separate	  premises:	  	  
(P1a):	  for	  a	  picture	  to	  be	  a	  pictorial	  representation,	  the	  experience	  it	  elicits	  in	  a	  standard	  
observer	  must	  include	  a	  sense	  of	  depth,	  which	  has	  to	  occur	  while	  the	  observer	  is	  looking	  
at	  the	  marked	  surface	  of	  the	  picture;	  
(P1b):	   in	   order	   to	   grasp	   the	   representational	   character	   of	   a	   picture	   an	   observer	  must	  
thematize	  the	  pictorial	  surface,	  i.e.	  seek	  to	  establish	  a	  contact	  with	  the	  picture’s	  maker	  
by	  means	  of	  grasping	  her	   intentions	   to	  communicate	  a	  given	  content	   through	   the	  pic-­‐
ture.	  
According	  to	  Wollheim,	  then,	  the	  distinction	  between	  figurative	  and	  abstract	  pictures	  
does	  not	   correspond	   to	   the	  distinction	  between	   representational	   and	  non-­‐representa-­‐
tional	  pictures,	  because	  also	  what	  we	  see	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  certain	  abstract	  pictures	  can	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be	  thematized	  in	  a	  specifically	  pictorial	  way,	  i.e.	  it	  is	  such	  that	  it	  elicits	  an	  experience	  of	  
seeing-­‐in.	  Let	  us	  call	  this	  the	  emergence/recession	  criterion	  for	  pictorial	  representation.	  
Wollheim	  brings	  two	  examples	  to	  illustrate	  his	  point:	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  Hans	  Hoffmann’s	  
Pompeii	  (1959)	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  Barnett	  Newmann’s	  Vir	  Heroicus	  Sublimis	  (1948).	  The	  
first	  painting	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  agglomerate	  of	  overlapping	  rectangles	  and	  is	  therefore	  
said	  to	  be	  an	  abstract	  picture	  that	  triggers	  an	  experience	  of	  depth.	  The	  second	  painting	  
presents	  some	  thin	  lines	  sharply	  cutting	  through	  what	  would	  otherwise	  look	  like	  a	  single	  
monochrome	  surface.	  This	  is	  said	  to	  be	  an	  abstract	  picture	  that	  does	  not	  trigger	  an	  ex-­‐
perience	  of	  depth	   (Wollheim	   [1987]:	   62).	   The	   first	   picture	   is	   a	  pictorial	   representation	  
while	  the	  second	  one	  is	  not.	  
Wollheim’s	  account	  presents	  a	  general	  problem:	  as	  Jerrold	  Levinson	  and	  John	  Hyman	  
have	   pointed	   out,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   understand	   how	   access	   to	   the	   painter’s	   intentions	  
could	  provide	  a	  standard	  of	  correctness	  for	  depiction.	  Compare	  the	  case	  of	  pictures	  with	  
the	  one	  of	  linguistic	  utterances:	  it	  is	  correct	  to	  say	  that	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  a	  meaningful	  
utterance	  a	  speaker	  must	  intend	  to	  say	  something,	  whereas	  it	  is	  not	  correct	  to	  say	  that	  
in	   order	   for	   an	   utterance	   to	   be	  meaningful	   the	   speaker	  must	  mean	   something	   by	   the	  
words	  she	  utters.	  If	  I	  paint	  a	  portrait	  of	  my	  mother	  with	  a	  wall	  on	  her	  back,	  I	   intend	  to	  
paint	  a	  portrait	  of	  my	  mother	  with	  a	  wall	  on	  her	  back.	   It	  may	  happen	  that,	  because	  of	  
the	  way	  I	  have	  painted	  the	  wall,	  the	  shape	  of	  a	  tree	  can	  be	  distinguished	  on	  it,	  although	  I	  
did	  not	  intend	  to	  depict	  the	  shape	  of	  a	  tree.	  The	  shape	  of	  the	  tree	  pictorially	  represents	  
the	  tree	  although	  I	  did	  not	  mean	  anything	  by	  painting	  it1.	  Therefore,	  we	  might	  reject	  (C)	  
claiming	  that	  (P1b)	  is	  false.	  I	  shall	  not	  pursue	  this	  strategy	  here	  and	  shall	  limit	  my	  analy-­‐
sis	  to	  the	  considerations	  Wollheim	  dedicates	  to	  abstract	  pictures.	   It	  might	  be,	  after	  all,	  
that	   they	   illuminate	   a	   relevant	   aspect	   of	   those	   images,	   and	   that	   the	   validity	   of	   them	  
does	  not	  entirely	  depend	  on	  (P1b).	  A	  different	  theory	  of	  pictorial	  experience	  –	  let	  us	  call	  
it	  (P1b*)	  –	  might	  be	  addressed,	  while	  maintaining	  that	  what	  is	  crucial	  for	  such	  an	  experi-­‐
ence	  is	  that	  a	  sense	  of	  depth	  is	  triggered	  in	  the	  viewer	  by	  the	  picture,	  in	  the	  specific	  way	  
described	  in	  premise	  (P2).	  This	  way	  C	  could	  be	  derived	  by	  (P1a),	  (P1b*),	  (P2)	  and	  (P3).	  	  
 
1	  See	  Hyman	  (2006):	  137-­‐138.	  Levinson	  stresses	  that	  «what	  it	  is	  for	  the	  pictorial	  intentions	  of	  the	  
artist	  of	  P	  to	  be	  fulfilled	  cannot	  be	  specified	  apart	  from	  what	  suitable	  viewers	  are	  enabled	  to	  see	  
in	  P»	  therefore	  «the	  artist’s	   intention	  cannot	  be	  thought	  as	  an	   independent	  condition	  to	  which	  
viewers’	  responses	  can	  be	  held	  accountable»	  (Levinson	  [1998]:	  231-­‐32).	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The	  trouble	  is	  that,	  as	  John	  Hyman	  has	  observed	  (Hyman	  [2006]:	  134),	  (P2)	  does	  not	  
describe	  an	  experience	  that	  necessarily	  has	  to	  take	  place	  when	  we	  are	  aware	  that	  a	  pic-­‐
ture	  pictorially	  represents	  certain	  objects.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  stick-­‐drawing	  of	  
a	  human	  figure	  on	  an	  otherwise	  blank	  sheet	  of	  paper	  like	  the	  one	  in	  fig.	  1,	  we	  have	  a	  fig-­‐
ure	  that	  is	  not	  shown	  in	  depth	  and	  a	  ground	  that	  is	  not	  the	  background	  of	  the	  depicted	  
scene,	  since	  it	  does	  not	  contribute	  to	  the	  content	  of	  the	  picture.	  The	  ground,	  in	  fact,	  is	  
certainly	  part	  of	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  picture	  qua	  ob-­‐
ject,	  but	  there	  are	  no	  clues	  that	  prompt	  us	  to	  con-­‐
sider	  it	  as	  part	  of	  the	  depictive	  content	  of	  the	  pic-­‐
ture2.	  If	  the	  stick-­‐figure	  is	  painted	  on	  a	  ground,	  but	  
without	   a	   background,	   then	   it	   is	   not	   represented	  
as	   if	   it	  were	  occupying	  a	  three-­‐dimensional	  space.	  
Therefore	  we	  have	  a	  representational	  picture	  that	  
does	  not	  set	  up	  an	  emergence/recession	  dynamics	  
and,	   therefore,	   a	   picture	   that	   does	   not	   trigger	   a	  
sense	   of	   depth	   in	   the	   viewer.	   To	   reformulate	   the	  
point	  in	  more	  general	  terms,	  I	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  represent	  two-­‐dimensional	  as-­‐
pects	  of	  objects	  pictorially	  (for	  instance,	  we	  can	  have	  a	  sketchy	  pictorial	  representation	  
of	  the	  outline	  of	  a	  human	  being)	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  not	  to	  represent	  objects	  as	  occu-­‐
pying	  the	  three-­‐dimensional	  space	  (for	  instance,	  we	  can	  have	  a	  pictorial	  representation	  
that	  is	  merely	  the	  representation	  of	  an	  outline).	  It	  follows	  that	  at	  least	  certain	  PRs	  do	  not	  
trigger	  an	  experience	  of	  depth	  in	  the	  viewer.	  Given	  that	  there	  are	  representational	  pic-­‐
tures	  that	  do	  not	  trigger	  an	  experience	  of	  depth,	  then,	  Wollheim’s	  emergence/recession	  
criterion	   is	  not	   successful	   in	  discriminating	  between	  pictures	   that	  are	   representational	  
and	   pictures	   that	   are	   not.	  We	   cannot	   use	   the	   emergence/recession	   criterion	   to	   argue	  
that	  those	  abstract	  pictures	  which	  do	  not	  trigger	  a	  sense	  of	  depth	  in	  the	  viewer	  are	  not	  
PRs.	  	  
To	   sum	   up,	   we	   can	   make	   the	   following	   claims:	   (i)	   the	   surface	   of	   a	   picture	   is	   its	  
ground:	  it	  is	  that	  side	  of	  a	  material	  object	  which	  is	  covered	  in	  marks	  and	  colours	  with	  the	  
intention	  to	  represent	  something;	  (ii)	  the	  ground	  or	  surface	  of	  a	  pictorial	  object	  can	  be	  
used	  as	  the	  background	  of	  a	  depicted	  scene,	  but	  need	  not;	  (iii)	  the	  outline	  of	  a	  figure	  can	  
 
2	  The	  distinction	  between	  a	  picture’s	  depictive	  content	  and	  its	  ground	  is	  a	  distinction	  between	  an	  
aspect	   of	   the	   picture	   qua	   three-­‐dimensional	   object	   and	   an	   aspect	   of	   the	   picture	   qua	   image.	  
Whereas	  the	  ground	  belongs	  to	  the	  picture	  qua	  object	  (the	  pictorial	  medium),	  the	  depicted	  con-­‐
tent	  is	  the	  content	  of	  the	  image.	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be	   depicted	  without	   the	   figure	   being	   shown	   as	   being	   part	   of	   a	   three-­‐dimensional	   pic-­‐
torial	  scene,	  i.e.	  without	  there	  being	  any	  emergence/recession	  dynamics	  that	  we	  notice	  
when	  we	  focus	  our	  attention	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  picture.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  ground	  of	  the	  
picture	  is	  not	  used	  as	  the	  background	  of	  any	  represented	  scene.	  
My	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  if	  there	  are	  figurative	  pictures	  that	  depict	  although	  they	  do	  not	  
elicit	   an	   emergence/recession	   experience	   in	   the	   viewer,	   then,	   contra	  Wollheim,	   there	  
might	  be	  abstract	  pictures	  that	  we	  might	  consider	  pictorial	  representations	  even	  if	  they	  
do	  not	  trigger	  an	  emergence/recession	  experience	  in	  the	  viewer.	  I	  shall	  now	  show	  how	  
certain	  claims	  by	  Clement	  Greenberg	  could	  be	   interpreted	   in	  order	   to	  support	   this	  hy-­‐
pothesis.	  
4.	  Clement	  Greenberg:	  abstract	  pictures	  and	  the	  figure/ground	  dynamics	  	  
Modernist	   Painters	   (1960)	   –	   an	   essay	   by	   American	   art	   critic	   and	   theoretician	   Clement	  
Greenberg	  –	  is	  widely	  considered	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  most	  accomplished	  examples	  of	  mod-­‐
ernist	  art	  criticism:	  it	  identifies	  the	  defining	  character	  of	  modernist	  art	  and	  seeks	  to	  de-­‐
scribe	   the	   logic	   of	   its	   development	   (the	   latter	   is	   a	   controversial	   attempt	   that	   is	   now	  
widely	   rejected	   and	   which,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   has	   granted	   to	   the	   essay	   much	   of	   its	  
fame)3.	  With	  «modernist	  art»	  Greenberg	  refers	   to	  all	   those	  works	  of	  art	  which	  show	  a	  
preoccupation	  with	  stressing	  what	  is	  peculiar	  of	  the	  art	  form	  they	  are	  exemplars	  of,	  es-­‐
pecially	   as	   a	   reaction	   against	   the	   assimilation	   of	   art	   to	   entertainment	   –	   a	   conception	  
that,	   according	   to	  Greenberg,	  became	  widespread	  with	   the	  Enlightenment	   (Greenberg	  
[1960]:	  774).	  Greenberg’s	  definition,	  of	  course,	  presupposes	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  identify	  
one	  or	  more	  aspects	   that	   are	  peculiar	   to	   a	   certain	   art	   form	  only.	  According	   to	  Green-­‐
berg,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  pictorial	  art	  the	  defining	  characters	  are	  «the	  flat	  surface,	  the	  shape	  
of	  the	  support,	  the	  properties	  of	  pigment»	  (Greenberg	  [1960]:	  775).	  I	  shall	  not	  concern	  
myself	  with	  the	  doubts	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  identifying	  once	  and	  for	  all	  the	  defining	  charac-­‐
ter	  of	  a	  given	  art	  form	  might	  raise.	  I	  shall	  assume	  that	  Greenberg	  has	  a	  point	  here,	  and	  
evaluate	  his	   claims	  without	  contesting	   this	  presupposition,	   since	  an	  assessment	  of	   the	  
 
3	  For	  a	  recent	  and	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  Greenberg’s	  work	  see	  Jones	  (2005)	  and	  for	  a	  strictly	  philo-­‐
sophical	  understanding	  of	  Greenberg’s	  ideas	  on	  modernism	  see	  Danto	  (1997):	  61-­‐78.	  Here	  I	  shall	  
not	  concern	  myself	  with	  Greenberg’s	  understanding	  (or	  misunderstanding)	  of	  the	  history	  of	  mod-­‐
ern	  and	  contemporary	  art.	  What	   I	  am	  interested	   in	   is	   the	  fact	  that	  Greenberg	  had	  to	  provide	  a	  
definition	  of	  pictorial	  art	  in	  order	  to	  articulate	  his	  thesis	  on	  modernist	  art,	  and	  that	  this	  definition	  
allowed	  him	  to	  trace	  interesting	  links	  between	  traditional	  figurative	  art	  and	  abstract	  art.	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general	   validity	  of	  his	   claims	   (or	   lack	   thereof)	   is	  not	  necessary	   to	   the	  present	  analysis.	  
What	  is	  relevant	  for	  me	  here	  is	  that	  Greenberg	  gives	  us	  conceptual	  tools	  to	  understand	  a	  
prominent	  modernist	  art	  form:	  abstract	  painting.	  
According	  to	  Greenberg	  (1960:	  774),	  modernist	  pictorial	  art,	  broadly	  conceived,	  is	  all	  
that	  pictorial	  art	  which	  stresses	  the	  flatness	  of	  the	  surface,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  pictorial	  
art	  which	  concentrates	  on	  sculptural	  and	  illusionistic	  effects	  (the	  Venetians	  as	  opposed	  
to	  Michelangelo,	  David	  as	  opposed	  to	  Fragonard,	  the	  Impressionists	  as	  opposed	  to	  Salon	  
painters	  and	  so	  on).	  There	  is,	  however,	  a	  narrower	  sense	  in	  which	  «modernism»	  desig-­‐
nates	   that	  pictorial	  art	  which	  makes	  the	  stressing	  of	   its	  defining	   features	   its	  main	  con-­‐
cern	  and	  very	  theme4.	  This	  is	  a	  tendency	  that	  strongly	  emerged	  with	  avant-­‐garde	  art	  and	  
is	  a	  dominant	  character	  of	  much	  XX	  century	  art.	  In	  Modernist	  Painters	  Greenberg	  seeks	  
to	   explain	  what	   it	   is	   that	  makes	   also	  paintings	   that	   cannot	   intuitively	  be	  distinguished	  
from	   decorative	   patterns,	   or	   from	   meaningless	   flat	   surfaces,	   belong	   to	   the	   realm	   of	  
modernist	  pictorial	  art.	  In	  trying	  to	  elucidate	  where	  the	  boundary	  between	  pictorial	  and	  
non-­‐pictorial	  art	  is	  to	  be	  traced,	  then,	  Greenberg	  further	  refines	  his	  requirements	  for	  a	  
work	   to	  be	  a	  modernist	  pictorial	  work.	  Here	  are	  Greenberg’s	   remarks	  on	  «borderline»	  
paintings:	  
Modernist	  painting	  in	  its	  latest	  phase	  […]	  has	  abandoned	  in	  principle	  […]	  the	  representation	  
of	   the	   kind	  of	   space	   that	   recognisable,	   three-­‐dimensional	  objects	   can	   inhabit	   […However],	  
The	   first	   mark	   made	   on	   a	   surface	   destroys	   its	   virtual	   flatness	   and	   the	   configuration	   of	   a	  
Mondrian	   still	   suggests	  a	  kind	  of	   illusion	  of	  a	   third	  dimension.	  Only	  now	   it	   is	  a	   strictly	  pic-­‐
torial,	  strictly	  optical	  third	  dimension.	  (Greenberg	  [1960]:	  775-­‐777)	  
A	   few	   lines	   below	  Greenberg	   qualifies	   the	   concept	   of	   «strictly	   optical	   third	   dimen-­‐
sion»	  in	  painting	  as	  the	  illusion	  (triggered	  by	  modernist	  paintings)	  of	  a	  space	  «into	  which	  
one	  can	  only	   look,	   can	   travel	   through	  only	  with	   the	  eye»	  as	  opposed	   to	   the	  «illusion»	  
triggered	   by	   traditional	   paintings,	   «an	   illusion	   of	   space	   into	   which	   one	   could	   imagine	  
oneself	   walking»	   (Greenberg	   [1960]:	   777).	   «Illusion»,	   then,	   could	   be	   paraphrased	   as	  
«what	   the	   painting	   prompts	   us	   to	   imagine»,	   what	   constitutes	   the	   visual	   subject	   of	   a	  
given	  painting.	  Greenberg	  distinguishes	  between	  what	  standard	  paintings	  prompt	  us	  to	  
imagine	  (i.e.	  a	  three-­‐dimensional	  space	  «into	  which	  one	  could	  imagine	  oneself	  walking»)	  
and	  what	  borderline	  paintings	  such	  as	  Mondrian’s	  grids	  prompt	  us	  to	  imagine.	  But	  how	  
should	  we	   characterize	   the	   latter?	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	  we	   could	   claim	   that	  Mondrian’s	  
grids	  require	  us	  to	  imagine	  a	  purely	  bi-­‐dimensional	  space,	  since,	  according	  to	  Greenberg,	  
 
4	  Greenberg	  (1960):	  775.	  Greenberg	  explores	  this	  topic	  also	  in	  Avant-­‐Garde	  and	  Kitsch	  (1939)	  and	  
Towards	  a	  New	  Laocoon	  (1940).	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here	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  a	  space	  that	  can	  only	  be	  looked	  at;	  however,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  why	  
we	  should	  say	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  representation	  gives	  us	  «a	  kind	  of	   illusion»	  of	  the	  third	  
dimension.	   It	   seems	  more	   reasonable	   to	   claim	   that	  we	   are	   not	   asked	   to	   imagine	   any	  
three-­‐dimensional	  space	  at	  all	  in	  this	  case.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  could	  claim	  that	  Mon-­‐
drian’s	  grids	  require	  us	  to	   imagine	  a	  three-­‐dimensional	  space	  through	  which,	   for	  some	  
reason,	   we	   cannot	   imagine	   walking.	   But	   this	   does	   not	   make	   sense.	   Here	   we	   have	  
reached	  a	  crossroads.	  If	  we	  do	  not	  want	  to	  reject	  Greenberg’s	  proposal	  because	  of	  the	  
inconsistency	  I	  have	  pointed	  out,	  then	  we	  need	  to	  settle	  for	  a	  charitable	  interpretation.	  
There	  are,	  I	  believe,	  two	  ways	  to	  be	  charitable	  towards	  Greenberg:	  1)	  we	  can	  decide	  not	  
to	  give	  relevance	  to	  Greenberg’s	  claim	  that	  Mondrian	  represents	  a	  space	  that	  can	  only	  
be	   imagined	  to	  be	   looked	  at,	  and	  to	  accept	   instead	  his	  claim	  that	  Mondrian	  gives	  us	  a	  
different	  form	  of	  «illusion»	  of	  the	  third	  dimension	  in	  his	  paintings;	  or	  2)	  we	  can	  decide	  
not	  to	  give	  relevance	  to	  Greenberg’s	  claim	  that	  Mondrian’s	   is	  an	  «illusion»	  of	  the	  third	  
dimension,	  and	  stress	   instead	  his	   claim	   that	   the	   space	  depicted	  by	  Mondrian	   is	  purely	  
optical.	  The	  former	  reading	  has	  been	  suggested	  by	  Jason	  Gaiger	  (2009:	  chap.	  6).	  In	  what	  
follows	  I	  shall	  illustrate	  Gaiger’s	  reading	  and	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  reasons	  to	  be	  sceptical	  
towards	   his	   interpretive	   proposal.	   Then,	   I	   shall	   explore	   the	   latter	   reading,	   and	   argue	  
that,	  although	  we	  might	  not	  be	  sure	  as	  to	  what	  exactly	  Greenberg	  had	  in	  mind,	  reading	  
2)	  might	  provide	  us	  with	  useful	  insights	  into	  the	  role	  of	  figure,	  ground	  and	  background	  in	  
abstract	  pictures,	  in	  a	  direction	  different	  from	  that	  suggested	  by	  Wollheim.	  
Gaiger’s	  interpretation	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  another	  of	  Greenberg’s	  essays,	  
The	  Pasted	  Paper	  Revolution	   (1958).	  Here	  Greenberg	  concentrates	  on	  the	  contribution	  
that	  the	  introduction	  of	  collage	  in	  the	  synthetic	  phase	  of	  cubism	  brings	  to	  the	  definition	  
of	   modernist	   pictorial	   art.	   Referring	   to	   George	   Braque’s	   Fruit	   Dish	   and	   Glass	   (1912)	  
Greenberg	  argues:	  
The	  strips,	  the	  lettering,	  the	  charcoaled	  lines	  and	  the	  white	  paper	  begin	  to	  change	  places	  in	  
depth	  with	  one	  another,	  and	  a	  process	  is	  set	  up	  in	  which	  every	  part	  of	  the	  picture	  takes	  its	  
turn	  at	  occupying	  every	  plane,	  whether	  real	  or	  imagined,	  in	  it.	  The	  imaginary	  planes	  are	  all	  
parallel	  to	  one	  another;	  their	  effective	  connection	  lies	   in	  their	  common	  relation	  to	  the	  sur-­‐
face;	  wherever	   a	   form	  on	  one	  plane	   slants	  or	   extends	   into	   another	   it	   immediately	   springs	  
forward.	  The	  flatness	  of	  the	  surface	  permeates	  the	  illusion,	  and	  the	  illusion	  re-­‐asserts	  itself	  
in	  the	  flatness.	  The	  effect	  is	  to	  fuse	  the	  illusion	  with	  the	  picture	  plane	  without	  derogation	  of	  
either	  –	  in	  principle.	  (Greenberg	  [1958]:	  63)	  
Gaiger	   stresses	   how	   this	   passage	   allows	   to	   see	   that	   for	   Greeneberg	   «the	   break-­‐
through	  of	  the	  collage	  technique	  lies	  not	  in	  the	  emphasis	  on	  surface	  pattern	  for	  its	  own	  
sake	  –	  something	  that	  would	  be	  indistinguishable	  from	  a	  merely	  decorative	  design	  –	  but	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in	  the	  dynamic	  tension	  that	  is	  set	  up	  between	  the	  picture	  surface	  and	  the	  representation	  
of	  depth	  […]	  This	  new	  and	  powerful	  “fusion”	  of	  the	  literal,	  physical	  surface	  of	  the	  picture	  
with	   the	   depicted	   content	   simultaneously	  mobilizes	   and	   undermines	   what	   for	   Green-­‐
berg	   remains	   the	   one	   indispensable	   condition	   of	   pictorial	   representation	   –	   the	   estab-­‐
lishment	  of	  a	  figure-­‐ground	  relationship»	  (Gaiger	  [2009]:	  128).	  
Gaiger	  stresses	  that	  for	  Greenberg	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  figure-­‐ground	  relationship	  
is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  a	  two-­‐dimensional	  surface	  to	  be	  considered	  a	  picture.	  He	  ar-­‐
gues	   that	  Greenberg	  «makes	   the	  working	  out	  of	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	  materi-­‐
ality	  of	  the	  picture	  surface	  and	  the	  representation	  of	  depth	  central	  to	  the	  development	  
of	  modernist	  painting»	  (Gaiger	  [2009]:	  130).	  That	  the	  representation	  of	  depth	  is	  central	  
is	  Gaiger’s	  interpretation	  of	  Greenberg’s	  (1960)	  claim	  that	  «the	  first	  mark	  made	  on	  a	  sur-­‐
face	  destroys	  its	  virtual	  flatness	  and	  the	  configuration	  of	  a	  Mondrian	  still	  suggests	  a	  kind	  
of	  illusion	  of	  a	  third	  dimension.	  Only	  now	  it	  is	  a	  strictly	  pictorial,	  strictly	  optical	  third	  di-­‐
mension»,	   and	  of	  Greenberg’s	   (1958)	   passage	   I	   have	  quoted	   above,	  where	  Greenberg	  
says	   that	  a	  «dynamic	   tension	   […]	   is	  set	  up	  between	  the	  picture	  surface	  and	  the	  repre-­‐
sentation	  of	  depth».	  According	   to	  Gaiger	   (2009:	  131),	  Greenberg’s	   idea	   is	   very	  akin	   to	  
Wollheim’s	   claim	   that	   a	   twofold	   phenomenology	   is	   the	   defining	   character	   of	   pictorial	  
representation,	  because	  Greenberg	  stresses	  that	  it	  is	  crucial	  that	  the	  viewer	  be	  aware	  of	  
a	  tension	  between	  the	  pictorial	  surface	  and	  the	  representation	  of	  depth.	  	  
I	   am	  sceptical	   towards	   this	   reading	  because,	   as	  we	  have	   seen	  above,	   I	   believe	   that	  
while	  we	   can	   accept	   that	  Wollheim’s	   twofold	   phenomenology	   applies	   to	   the	   dialectic	  
between	   figure	   and	  background	   of	   a	   pictorial	   scene,	  we	  do	  not	   have	   good	   reasons	   to	  
claim	  that	  it	  applies	  to	  those	  pictures	  that	  depict	  figures	  without	  backgrounds,	  and	  I	  be-­‐
lieve	   that	  Greenberg’s	   remarks	   are	  about	   the	   figures	   (or,	  more	  generally,	   the	  pictorial	  
content)	   and	   the	  ground	  of	   certain	  paintings	  where	  we	  have	  no	  depicted	  background.	  
(As	  I	  have	  explained	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  whereas	  the	  ground	  is	  a	  property	  of	  the	  ma-­‐
terial	  support	  of	  a	  picture,	  the	  background	  is	  a	  property	  that	  the	  representational	  con-­‐
tent	  of	  a	  picture	  might	  or	  might	  not	  have.	  A	  picture	  does	  not	  need	  to	  represent	  objects	  
including	   a	   background).	   According	   to	   my	   reading,	   when	   Greenberg	   stresses	   that	   we	  
need	  to	  distinguish	  between	  figure	  and	  ground	  in	  order	  for	  a	  surface	  to	  be	  a	  picture,	  he	  
might	  be	  stressing	   that	  we	  need	   to	   regard	   the	  surface	  as	  hinting	  at	   something	  else	  by	  
means	  of	  its	  visual	  properties	  in	  order	  to	  consider	  it	  a	  pictorial	  surface	  (as	  opposed	  to	  a	  
decorative	   pattern	   or	   a	  mere	   two-­‐dimensional	   surface),	   and	   that	   cubist	   collages	   (and	  
Mondrian’s	  grids)	  point	  out	   this	  very	   fact	  about	  pictorial	   surfaces.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  
that	  Greenberg	  claims	  that	  all	  pictures,	  cubist	  collages	  and	  Mondrian’s	  grid	  paintings	  in-­‐
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cluded,	  need	   to	   set	  up	  a	  dialectic	  between	   figure	  and	  background	   in	  order	   to	  be	   con-­‐
sidered	  pictures,	  and	  especially	  a	  dialectic	  of	  the	  kind	  described	  by	  Wollheim.	  
	  Let	   us	   go	   back	   to	   Greenberg’s	   words	   and	   apply	   to	   them	   the	   new	   reading	   I	   have	  
sketched:	  
The	  strips,	  the	  lettering,	  the	  charcoaled	  lines	  and	  the	  white	  paper	  begin	  to	  change	  places	  in	  
depth	  with	  one	  another,	  and	  a	  process	  is	  set	  up	  in	  which	  every	  part	  of	  the	  picture	  takes	  its	  
turn	  at	  occupying	  every	  plane,	  whether	  real	  or	  imagined,	  in	  it.	  [...]	  The	  flatness	  of	  the	  surface	  
permeates	  the	  illusion,	  and	  the	  illusion	  re-­‐asserts	   itself	   in	  the	  flatness.	  The	  effect	   is	  to	  fuse	  
the	  illusion	  with	  the	  picture	  plane	  without	  derogation	  of	  either	  –	  in	  principle.	  
Greenberg	  says	  that	  the	  flatness	  of	  the	  surface	  in	  Braque’s	  painting	  «permeates	  the	  
illusion»,	  that	  the	  two	  are	  fused	  together.	  What	  does	  this	  mean?	  «Illusion»,	  I	  believe,	  re-­‐
fers	  to	  the	  dimension	  of	  the	  imagination	  a	  picture	  asks	  the	  viewer	  to	  enter,	  the	  pictorial	  
world	  a	  picture	  asks	  the	  viewer	  to	  picture	  herself.	  According	  to	  this	  reading,	  what	  is	  pe-­‐
culiar	   about	   the	   pictorial	   world	   in	   Cubist	   collages	   is	   that	   it	   is	   purely	   two-­‐dimensional	  
(«the	   imaginary	   planes	   are	   all	   parallel	   to	   one	   another»).	   How	   would	   Cubist	   collages	  
achieve	  the	  effect	  of	  representing	  a	  purely	  two-­‐dimensional	  world?	  Here,	  I	  believe,	  our	  
understanding	  of	  Greenberg’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  «depth»	  is	  crucial.	  My	  suggestion	  is	  that	  
what	  «changes	  places	  in	  depth»	  are	  the	  multiple	  layers	  applied	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  col-­‐
lage,	  and	  not	  imagined	  forms	  in	  the	  pictorial	  world.	  Greenberg,	  then,	  might	  be	  claiming	  
that	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  collage	  is	  multi-­‐layered	  and	  therefore	  three-­‐dimensional	  and,	  at	  
the	  same	  time,	  he	  might	  be	  claiming	  that	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  collage	  is	  very	  democratic,	  in	  
that	  «every	  part	  of	  the	  picture	  takes	  its	  turn	  at	  occupying	  every	  plane,	  whether	  real	  or	  
imagined,	  in	  it».	  As	  a	  consequence,	  he	  might	  be	  stressing	  that,	  despite	  its	  three-­‐dimen-­‐
sional	  character,	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  painting	  does	  not	  establish	  any	  hierarchy	  of	  planes,	  
and	  that,	  therefore,	  it	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  ascribing	  depth	  to	  the	  pictorial	  world	  it	  asks	  us	  
to	  imagine.	  The	  impossibility	  of	  establishing	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  planes	  on	  the	  pictorial	  surface	  
would	  allow	  for	  the	  attribution	  of	   flatness,	  of	   two-­‐dimensionality,	   to	  the	   imagined	  pic-­‐
torial	  world5.	  	  
 
5	  A	   reading	   of	  Mondrian’s	   grids	   that	   firmly	   stresses	   their	   flat	   character	   has	   been	   suggested	   by	  
John	  Golding:	  «Mondrian	  made	  full	  use	  of	  the	  grids	  or	  scaffoldings	  of	  high	  Analytic	  Cubism,	  but	  
put	  them	  to	  new	  ends,	  right	  from	  the	  start.	  He	  was	  not	  concerned	  with	  opening	  his	  subjects	  into	  
the	  space	  around	  them	  and	  then	  in	  exploring	  the	  tactility,	  the	  palpability	  of	  this	  space;	  […]	  Mon-­‐
drian	  wanted,	  on	   the	  contrary,	   to	  destroy	   the	  distinction	  between	   figure	  and	  ground,	  between	  
matter	   and	   non-­‐matter.	   The	   planes	   into	  which	   he	   dissolves	   the	   image	   and	   the	   space	   that	   sur-­‐
rounds	  it	  are	  invariably	  strictly	  frontal,	  and	  they	  reaffirm	  the	  flatness	  of	  the	  pictorial	  support.	  Al-­‐
though	  these	  planes	  hover	  and	  hang	  in	  front	  of	  and	  behind	  each	  other,	  they	  do	  not	  slide	  in	  and	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The	  reading	  I	  have	  outlined	  supports	  interpretive	  hypothesis	  2),	  according	  to	  which,	  
from	  Greenberg’s	   remarks	  on	  Mondrian	   it	  can	  be	  deduced	  that	  Greenberg	  did	  not	  be-­‐
lieve	  «late	  modernist	  paintings»	  to	  trigger	  an	  experience	  of	  depth	  in	  the	  viewer	  and/or	  
to	   make	   the	   viewer	   think	   about	   a	   three-­‐dimensional	   scene,	   since	   Greenberg	   charac-­‐
terized	  them	  as	  fostering	  the	  illusion	  of	  a	  purely	  optical	  space.	  This	  reading	  is	  sustained	  
by	  the	  observation	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  a	  figure/ground	  relation	  of	  the	  kind	  men-­‐
tioned	  by	  Greenberg	  in	  his	  essay	  on	  Cubist	  collage,	  we	  only	  need	  to	  treat	  a	  suitable	  ob-­‐
ject	  as	  a	  picture,	  i.e.	  as	  a	  two-­‐dimensional	  surface	  with	  marks	  and	  colours	  on	  it	  that	  we	  
can	  regard	  as	  conveyors	  of	  pictorial	  meaning.	  This	  can	  be	  done	  both	  in	  the	  case	  of	  col-­‐
lage	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Mondrian’s	  grids,	  I	  believe,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  we	  have	  a	  
twofold	   experience	  of	   the	   kind	   described	  by	  Wollheim	  when	   looking	   at	   such	  pictures.	  
The	  case	  of	  the	  recognition	  of	  a	  figure/background	  relation	  within	  a	  pictorial	  surface	  is	  
different.	   If	  we	   identify	  a	   figure/background	  relation	  on	  a	  pictorial	   surface,	   this	  means	  
that	  we	  have	  a	  good	  reason	  to	  describe	  the	  pictorial	  content	  of	  the	  picture	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  
three-­‐dimensional	  pictorial	  scene,	  to	  which	  we	  can	  attribute	  a	  background.	  In	  this	  case	  a	  
sense	  of	  depth,	  or	  maybe	  an	  act	  of	  imagining	  depth,	  has	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account.	  
The	   interpretive	   hypothesis	   I	   have	   sketched	   out	   is	   meant	   to	   illustrate	   that	   Green-­‐
berg’s	  passages	  on	  Cubist	  collages	  and	  Mondrian’s	  grids	  might	  be	  given	  a	   reading	   that	  
would	  bring	  to	  conclusions	  incompatible	  with	  the	  ones	  Gaiger	  draws	  from	  them.	  I	  doubt	  
that	  there	  is	  a	  way	  to	  settle	  the	  disagreement	  between	  Gaiger	  and	  me.	  What	  the	  intro-­‐
duction	  of	  an	  alternative	  explanatory	  hypothesis	  is	  supposed	  to	  stress	  is	  that	  we	  should	  
be	  cautious	  in	  adopting	  a	  definitive	  reading	  of	  Greenberg	  on	  the	  question	  as	  of	  how	  ex-­‐
actly	  the	  distinction	  between	  pictorial	  and	  non-­‐pictorial	  should	  be	  traced.	  However,	  the	  
fact	   that	  Greenberg’s	   remarks	  are	  difficult	   to	   interpret	  does	  not	  make	  them	   less	   inter-­‐
esting	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  present	  discussion.	  Greenberg,	  namely,	  gives	  us	  conceptual	  
tools	  which	  allow	  us	  to	  think	  of	  abstracts	   in	  terms	  different	  from	  those	  put	  forward	  by	  
Wollheim:	  he	  shows	  us	  where	  to	  look	  at,	  although	  we	  may	  need	  to	  find	  elsewhere	  the	  
arguments	  to	  decide	  how	  to	  interpret	  what	  he	  has	  made	  us	  turn	  our	  gaze	  towards.	  	  
 
out	  of	   space	  as	  happens	   in	  contemporary	  canvases	  by	  Picasso	  and	  Braque.	  Similarly,	   lights	  and	  
darks	  are	  not	  angled	  against	  each	  other	   to	  produce	  a	   sensation	  of	   volume	  and	  depth;	   and	   the	  
blacks	   of	   Mondrian’s	   scaffoldings	   already	   begin	   to	   read	   as	   dark	   elements	   in	   their	   own	   right»	  
(Golding	  [2000]:	  20).	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5.	  Conclusions	  
To	  recapitulate,	  (1)	   I	  have	  assumed	  that	  pictorial	  representation	  is	  a	  distinctive	  feature	  
of	   (at	   least)	   all	   figurative	  pictures;	   (2)	   I	   have	  defined	  «pictorial	   representation»	  as	   the	  
representation	  of	  visual	  objects	  (or	  aspects	  of	  them)	  by	  means	  of	  the	  pictorial	  content	  of	  
two-­‐dimensional	   pictorial	   surfaces	   (the	   content	   determined	   by	   the	   arrangement	   of	  
marks	  and	  colours	  on	  pictorial	  surfaces);	  (3)	   I	  have	  criticised	  Wollheim’s	  claim	  that	  pic-­‐
tures	  pictorially	  represent	  in	  that	  they	  elicit	  a	  seeing-­‐in	  experience	  in	  the	  viewer,	  point-­‐
ing	  out	  that	  there	  are	  figurative	  pictures	  that	  do	  not	  elicit	  such	  an	  experience;	  (4)	  I	  have	  
hypothesised,	   contra	  Wollheim,	   that	   of	   certain	   abstract	   pictures	  we	   can	   say	   that	   they	  
are	  pictorial	   representation	  even	   though	   they	  do	  not	  elicit	   an	  experience	  of	   seeing-­‐in;	  
(5)	  I	  have	  identified	  some	  alternative	  conceptual	  tools	  for	  understanding	  the	  representa-­‐
tional	   character	  of	   abstract	  pictures	  by	  means	  of	  an	  analysis	  of	  Greenberg’s	   claims	  on	  
the	   pictorial	   character	   of	   Cubist	   Collages	   and	   Mondrian’s	   grids.	   In	   particular,	   I	   have	  
stressed	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   distinction	   between	  background	   (of	   a	   depicted	   scene)	  
and	  ground	  (of	  a	  picture	  qua	  material	  object).	  It	  remains	  to	  show	  if	  and	  how	  an	  account	  
of	  Mondrian’s	  grids	  and	  Cubist	  Collages	  as	  pictorial	   representations	  can	  be	  built	  up	  ef-­‐
fectively	  with	  these	  conceptual	  tools,	  but	  this	  is	  a	  task	  for	  another	  paper.	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